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CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE’S NEXT 
IMPERMISSIBLE BURDEN ON 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
TREY O’CALLAGHAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) requirement that eligible religious 
organizations submit a notice objecting to providing their employees 
contraceptive coverage (Accommodation) if they religiously object to 
contraception or abortifacients is as simple as filing a piece of paper. But to 
a collection of Catholic petitioners complying with this requirement gives 
rise to “scandal” and causes them to “materially cooperate” with sin. Filing 
a piece of paper may seem far outside any exercise of religion, but these 
groups sincerely believe that the one page notice burdens their religious 
beliefs. 
Zubik v. Burwell,1 like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,2 presents a 
conflict between the ACA and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), a statute that gives religious groups a shield and a sword against 
federal laws and regulations that interfere with their free exercise of 
religion. In Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court held that RFRA prohibits the 
Government from forcing certain closely-held, religious corporations to 
provide contraceptive coverage to their employees. Here the Court should 
extend Hobby Lobby and hold that the accommodation impermissibly 
burdens these religious groups’ beliefs under the demanding RFRA statute. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The ACA3 requires group health plans to provide, without cost sharing, 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.) cert.
granted in part sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva 
Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015). 
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, n.28 (2014).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C § 18001 (2012).
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preventive care for women.4 Under that statutory authority, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) adopted regulations that require 
health plans to cover contraceptive services for women (the “Contraceptive 
Mandate” or “Mandate”), but it carved out certain religious exceptions and 
accommodations.5 
A “religious employer” is exempted.6 The “religious employer” 
classification is taken from the Internal Revenue Code’s church 
classification.7 In contrast, a nonprofit that is religiously opposed to part or 
all of the contraceptive mandate (eligible organization) is accommodated.8 
If accommodated, an eligible organization is not required to contract or pay 
for contraceptive coverage.9 Instead, the eligible organization’s third-party 
administrator (TPA) or health insurance issuer (collectively “Third Party”) 
pays for and administers the service.10 
To receive the accommodation, the organization must either  provide its 
Third Party a form certifying its religious objection to any or all 
contraceptive services (Form 700), or send HHS an objection (HHS Notice) 
alongside information about its insurance provider and plan.11 In this latter 
case, HHS notifies the Department of Labor about the eligible 
organization’s objection, and the Department informs the eligible 
organization’s Third Party (DOL Notice).12 The Government states that this 
information is “the minimum information necessary . . . to determine which 
entities are covered by the accommodation, to administer the 
accommodation, and to implement” the contraceptive mandate.13Also, an 
eligible organization must continually update HHS with any new 
information.14 If an eligible organization does not comply with the 
accommodation or provide contraceptive coverage to its employees, the 
Government imposes a severe monetary penalty.15 
When a Third Party receives a Form 700 or DOL Notice, and if it 
agrees to “remain in a contractual relationship with the eligible 
 
 4.  Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 5.  Geneva, 778 F.3d at 427. 
 6.  Id. at 428. 
 7.  Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015). 
 8.  Geneva, 778 F.3d at 428. 
 9.  Id. at 429. 
 10.  Id. at 429. 
 11.  Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 12.  Id. at 949. 
 13.  Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under The ACA, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,095 (Aug. 
27, 2014). 
 14.  29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715–2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2015). 
 15.  Dordt, 801 F.3d at 950. 
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organization,” it must “provide or arrange[] payments for contraception 
services” for the plan’s beneficiaries.16 A Third Party must also provide 
notice to the eligible organization’s plan beneficiaries that it—not the 
eligible organization—is administering and funding the beneficiaries’ 
contraceptive coverage.17 The Third Party may seek reimbursement and 
additional compensation from the federal government for providing these 
services.18 
Petitioners (Catholic Groups)19 are twenty-nine employers that 
religiously object to the contraceptive mandate and the mandate’s 
accommodation.20 The Catholic Groups want to provide their employees21 
health insurance.22 But the Catholic Groups contend that complying with 
the contraceptive mandate’s accommodation violates their religious 
beliefs.23 
The Catholic Groups’ object to the contraceptive mandate because they 
believe that “human life begins at conception, and that certain ‘preventive’ 
services that interfere with conception or terminate a pregnancy are 
immoral” or sinful.24 Furthermore, the Catholic Church prohibits “material 
cooperation”—i.e., “facilitating the wrongdoing of others.”25 And it 
prohibits “giving scandal”—i.e., “tempting others, by words or actions, to 
engage in immoral conduct.”26 The Catholic Groups believe that complying 
with the contraceptive mandate directly or via the accommodation causes 
them to violate these tenants of faith because filing a notice triggers an 
obligation for Third Parties to provide the objectionable coverage to the 
Catholic Groups’ female employees.27 Also, they object to the 
 
 16.  29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715–2713A (2015) (describing requirements for TPAs); see also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.131(c)(1)(i) (2015) (describing similar requirements for insurance issuers). 
 17.  Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  For simplicity, Petitoners are referred to as Catholic Groups although some belong to 
different Christian denominations. 
 20.  Brief for the Respondents at 19, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 
15-105, 15-119, 15-191 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents]; Brief for 
Petitioners in Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453 & 14-505 at 19, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. Jan. 4, 
2016) [hereinafter Brief for Zubik Petitioners]. 
 21.  “Employees” is used for simplicity even though some beneficiaries are students. 
 22.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 16–18 (noting they have been providing their 
employees three types of high-quality health plans without coverage for abortifacients or contraception: 
self-insured plans, self-insured church plans, and insured plans). 
 23.  Id. at 18–19. 
 24.  Id. at 17. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 19. “Female employees” is used throughout the commentary to include any male 
employee with female relatives or dependents covered under his health care plan. 
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accommodation because it forces them to maintain a contractual 
relationship with abortifacient providers.28 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Enacting RFRA 
Congress enacted RFRA29 after the Supreme Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith30 overturned, in most contexts, Sherbert v. Verner31 and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.32 Sherbert and Yoder held that a law that substantially 
burdens a person’s religious exercise is strictly scrutinized. Now under 
Smith generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise 
but are otherwise valid are typically constitutional.33 
In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA, which purports to 
reinstate the Sherbert and Yoder strict scrutiny test. Under RFRA, “[the 
Federal] Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”34 
Importantly, this test only applies to sincere and religious claims.35 
Claims that are a pretext for avoiding complying with the law and claims 
that are “nonreligious in motivation” do not receive special privileges.36 
However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to question a claimant’s 
religious beliefs, even if the beliefs are not mainstream. For example, the 
claimant in Thomas v. Review Board was substantially burdened when 
building part of a turret, although he did not religiously object to 
fabricating sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses or object to producing 
raw materials that would be used to build a tank.37 His religious objections 
were “not articulated with . . . clarity and precision,” but the Court allowed 
him to draw this line stating that it was “ill equipped” to judicially 
 
 28.  Id. at 48. 
 29.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 30.  Emp’t Div. Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
 31.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 32.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 33.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 34.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 35.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, n.28 (2014); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). 
 36.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at n.28; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
 37.  Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710, 715. 
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investigate specific religious creeds.38 
B.  Hobby Lobby 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court used RFRA to invalidate 
certain ACA provisions.39 In that case, for-profit, closely-held corporations 
religiously objected to the ACA requirement that they pay for their 
employees’ contraceptive coverage or face a penalty.40 In applying RFRA, 
the Court held that RFRA’s broad protection for religious liberty extends to 
for-profit, closely-held corporations.41 
The Government in Hobby Lobby argued that the contraceptive 
requirement did not burden the companies because the connection between 
paying for an employee’s contraception coverage and the destruction of a 
beneficiary’s embryo was too attenuated.42 The Court rejected this 
argument because it does not inquire whether a belief is reasonable.43 In 
effect, the Court held that it must credit the companies’ beliefs about the 
“circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that 
is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the 
commission of an immoral act by another.”44 Thus, it held that the mandate 
was a substantial burden and proceeded to apply strict scrutiny.45 
The Court assumed that “guaranteeing cost-free access to the . . . 
challenged contraceptive methods [was] compelling.”46 Next, the Court 
held that least-restrictive alternative test is “exceptionally demanding”47 
and was not satisfied because the Government could have possibly paid for 
contraceptive coverage.48 Also, the Court stated that the accommodation 
would be a less restrictive alternative, but it did not hold that the 
accommodation was permissible per se.49 
In sum, in light of Hobby Lobby, it is clear that mandating a nonprofit 
when it has a sincere religious objection to contraception to either pay for 
its employees’ contraception coverage or face a financial penalty violates 
 
 38.  Id. at 715. 
 39.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 2775. 
 42.  Id. at 2777. 
 43.  Id. at 2778. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 2779. 
 46.  Id. at 2780. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. at 2780–81 (reasoning that the most “straight-forward” way for women to obtain 
contraception was for the Government to pay for it, without relying on this alternative). 
 49.  Id. at 2782. 
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RFRA. But it is unclear whether the Accommodation is permissible under 
RFRA. 
C.  Procedural History 
The Catholic Groups filed suits in nine district courts within the Third, 
Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits challenging the accommodation under 
RFRA.50 Seven of the suits were at least partially successful in their 
respective district courts.51 On appeal, the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuits all rejected the Catholic Groups’ claims.52 The only dissenting 
panel judge was Judge Baldock in the Tenth Circuit.53 Moreover, all four 
circuits denied rehearing en banc.54 Yet multiple judges in the Fifth, Tenth, 
and D.C. Circuits dissented from the denial orders. 
After the rehearing denials, the Catholic Groups filed writs of 
certiorari.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for each case on 
November 6, 2015 and consolidated the appeals.56 
Also, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
addressed this issue in cases not consolidated before the Supreme Court.57 
The Eight Circuit is the only circuit that ruled for the Catholic Groups.58 
III.  HOLDING 
The Third,59 Fifth,60 Tenth,61 and D.C. Circuits62 rejected the Catholic 
 
 50.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 20. 
 51.  Id. at 21. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 23. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 4. 
 56.  Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015); 
Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015); Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015); E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015). 
 57.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 24; see also Eternal Word Television Network, 
Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 14-12696, 2016 WL 659222, at *1 (11th Cir. 
Feb. 18, 2016) (deciding this case for the Government after briefing here). 
 58.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 24, n.12. 
 59.  Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.) cert. 
granted in part sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva 
Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015). 
 60.  E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir.) cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 444, 
(2015). 
 61.  Little Sisters of the Poor Home, 794 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir.) cert. granted sub nom. S. 
Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) and cert. granted in part sub nom. Little Sisters of 
the Poor Home v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015). 
 62.  Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) cert. 
granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and 
cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015). 
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Groups’ RFRA claims. Each circuit held that the accommodation does not 
substantially burden the groups’ exercise of religion.63 The circuit courts 
purported not to question the sincerity of the Catholic Groups’ beliefs.64 
However, they refused to accept the the Catholic Groups’ characterization 
of the accommodation.65 In other words, the courts purported to believe the 
Catholic Groups when the groups claimed that they felt as though their 
religious beliefs were substantially burdened, but as a matter of law the 
courts determined that they were not substantially burdened.66 
The courts held that once an eligible organization “avails itself of the 
accommodation, that organization has discharged its legal obligations 
under the challenged regulations.”67 The accommodation is a de minimis 
burden.68 The circuits reasoned that the Catholic Groups were attempting to 
religiously veto the “legally required conduct of third parties” because the 
accommodation provides the Catholic Groups an “op-out mechanism that 
shifts to third parties the obligation[s]” under the contraceptive mandate. 69 
This opt-out “fastidiously relieves Plaintiffs” of anything that might 
constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.70 
In addition, the D.C. Circuit held the accommodation survived strict 
scrutiny under RFRA because it is the least restrictive means of furthering 
the Government’s “compelling interest in providing women full and equal 
benefits of preventative health coverage.”71 The D.C. Circuit stated that the 
Government could only ensure seamless employee contraceptive coverage 
if eligible organizations communicate their religious objections via the 
accommodation.72 And, even though the mandate exempts some 
organizations, the exemptions are limited to the Government’s interest in a 
uniform system of laws.73 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioners Must Prove The Accommodation Substantially Burdens 
 
 63.  See, e.g., Geneva Coll, 778 F.3d at 444. 
 64.  See, e.g., id. at 436. 
 65.  See, e.g., id. 
 66.  See, e.g., Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
 67.  Id. at 250. 
 68.  See, e.g., id. at 249. 
 69.  Id. at 251. 
 70.  Id. at 251– 52. 
 71.  Id. at 264. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 266. 
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Their Religious Exercise 
1.  Catholic Groups’ Arguments 
The Catholic Groups argue that the contraceptive mandate forces them 
“to engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs on pain 
of substantial penalties,” and therefore the mandate is a quintessential 
example of a substantial burden to religious exercise.74 It is undisputed that 
the non-compliance penalties are severe. The Catholic Groups will be 
exposed to the same penalties as the plaintiffs in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
and there the Court determined that such penalties are substantial.75 Also, 
the Mandate requires them to act.76 In fact, HHS regulations state that 
actions by eligible organizations are “necessary” for employees to get 
contraceptive coverage.77 
It is not for the Court to question the sincerity of the Catholic Groups’ 
beliefs. It must accept the Petitioners’ beliefs about private religious 
questions like when an innocuous act becomes burdensome—or gives rise 
to scandal and material cooperation—as a result of its connection with a 
proscribed religious act.78 The Catholic Groups believe that they exercise 
religion when they contract with insurance companies and when they 
refuse to submit the accommodation notices.79 The Petitioners’ sincerely 
held religious beliefs are violated because they are forced to take an action 
that facilitates the Government’s conscription of the Catholic Group’s 
health care plan infrastructures and TPAs to provide objectionable 
coverage.80 The Catholic Groups’ beliefs should not questioned by the 
Court.81 
Nevertheless, the Government argues and the circuits below held that 
(1) the Catholic Groups’ “act” is not a legally recognizable harm because 
they are only “opting out” of requirements; and (2) the groups are objecting 
to independent, third-party acts. The Catholic Groups respond to this 
criticism in two ways. 
First, they contend that the Government and circuit courts 
 
 74.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 27. 
 75.  Id. at 38–39. 
 76.  Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191 at 47, E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. 
Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for ETBU Petitioners]. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 32. 
 79.  Id. at 35–36. 
 80.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 49. 
 81.  Id. 
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mischaracterize the accommodation as an “opt-out.”82 In fact, the Catholic 
Groups believe the term “accommodation” is also a mischaracterization.83 
They prefer to call it the “alternative compliance mechanism” because the 
accommodation is actually “a way for religious organizations to ‘compl[y] 
with the mandate.’”84 Regardless, the accommodation’s characterization is 
not fundamental to their argument because the Court should not inquire 
into whether the “opt-out” relieves the Catholic Groups of moral 
culpability because that is an inherently religious question.85 
Ultimately, the Catholic Groups argue that the opt-out 
mischaracterization occurs because the Government and circuits “badly 
distort[] the substantial-burden inquiry” by questioning the sincerity of the 
groups’ beliefs.86 Circuits have done this by focusing on the de minimis 
amount of effort required to complete the accommodation,87 and by 
dismissing the Catholic Groups’ theological beliefs about “scandal” and 
“material cooperation” that result from filing the notice.88 But as one 
Catholic bishop testified, while the forms only take “a few minutes to 
sign,” “the ramifications are eternal.”89 The potential significance of 
seemingly minor acts was echoed by a Fifth Circuit dissenting judge: 
“Thomas More went to the scaffold rather than sign a little paper for the 
King.”90 “Plainly it was the scaffold, not the toil of signing, that 
substantially burdened his religious beliefs.”91 The Catholic Groups argue 
the statute is clear on this point; “RFRA expressly protects ‘any exercise of 
religion.’”92 The Government may not compel the Catholic Groups to file 
paperwork, call that paperwork necessary for the mandate, and then dismiss 
the Catholic Groups’ objections to these requirements, if they are crediting 
the Petitioners’ beliefs as sincere.93 
Second, the Catholic Groups’ claims are not precluded even though 
their religious exercise involves interactions with third parties and 
 
 82.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 43. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1) (2015)). 
 85.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 44. 
 86.  Id. at 41. 
 87.  Id. at 41–42. 
 88.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 48. 
 89.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 43. 
 90.  E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 630, 635 (5th Cir. 2015) (Jones, J., dissenting) 
reh’g denied. 
 91.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 47–48. 
 92.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 42 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 
S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014)). 
 93.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 47. 
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independent actors.94 The Supreme Court’s precedent is clear: The claimant 
in Thomas v. Review Board was religious burdened when he built a turret 
although only third parties were going to use the turret in war.95 And in 
Hobby Lobby the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion was burdened because their 
actions might have enabled a third party to destroy an embryo.96 
In any event, the Catholic Groups are not objecting to third-party 
action, but rather their own involvement in a contraception scheme.97 
Contrary to the Government’s argument, Third Parties are not under an 
independent obligation to deliver contraception coverage to the Catholic 
Groups’ employees.98 No obligation exists unless the Catholic Groups “(a) 
maintain an objectionable contractual relationship with their insurance 
companies and then (b) submit the objectionable ‘self-certification’ or 
‘notice.’”99 That is why it is necessary for the Government to penalize 
Petitioners for not submitting the accommodation notices.100 Responsibility 
for providing contraception to employees—and the unique benefit of extra 
payment from the Government to the Third Party—only arises after an 
eligible organization’s action.101 Thus, the Catholic Groups’ religious 
objections are tailored to their own action, not third-party action or internal 
government affairs.102 
2.  Government’s Arguments 
According to the Government, the accommodation allows the Catholic 
Groups to opt out of the mandate and relieves them of all recognizable 
religious burdens.103 After an objection is filed, Catholic Groups are not 
“required to exercise any contractual or other authority that they possess to 
‘authorize, obligate, or incentivize’ issuers or TPAs to provide 
contraception coverage.”104 Instead, the Government mandates that Third 
Parties provide coverage through the Government’s independent 
 
 94.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 30. 
 95.  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 715 (1981). 
 96.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 97.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 45. 
 98.  Id. at 4 (The Zubik Petitioners also state “the supposed ‘independent obligation’ is irrelevant 
because Petitioners object to hiring or a maintaining a relationship with any insurance company that is 
authorized . . . to deliver the objection coverage . . . regardless of [how] that authority, obligation, or 
incentive is ‘trigged.’”). 
 99.  Id. at 48–49. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 49. 
 102.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 54–55. 
 103.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 34–35. 
 104.  Id. at 37. 
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authority.105 Thus, although filing a Form 700 or HHS Notice “gives rise to 
the occasion for the government to act,” it does not mean the “issuer’s or 
TPA’s legal obligation . . . derive[s] from” a Catholic Group’s filing—i.e., 
the Third Parties have an independent obligation.106 
The Government dismisses the Catholic Groups’ argument “that the 
accommodation is not a true opt-out because an employer that invokes it is 
deemed to ‘comply’” with the contraceptive mandate.107 According to the 
Government, this is petty semantics. Were the regulations to use “excused” 
instead of “complied,” the groups would take the same steps to opt out and 
would not be able to show that those steps result in a religious burden.108 
This argument is bolstered by the Government’s characterization of the 
Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby.109 The Court described the 
accommodation as an “opt-out,” and it wrote that the regulations 
“effectively exempt” objecting religious employers from the mandate.110 
The Government acknowledges that the Court’s description of the 
accommodation was dicta, but it argues that the Court correctly describes 
how the accommodation works, and its reasoning is persuasive.111 
Alternatively, even if the contraceptive mandate burdens the Catholic 
Groups, the Government argues that it does not substantially burden 
them.112 First, the Government notes that it is the Catholic Groups’ burden 
to prove that a regulation substantially burdens their free exercise.113 Next, 
the Government points out that pre-Smith decisions recognized that claimed 
religious burdens often do not qualify as legally recognizable substantial 
burdens. In Bowen v. Roy, the parents’ free exercise of religion was not 
legally burdened when the government used their child’s social security 
number—in violation of the parents’ sincerely held religious belief that 
such use of the social security number was burdensome—because the 
claimants were attempting to change internal government rules.114 Similarly 
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary, Native Americans were not able to 
prevent the government from building through sacred tribal land, although 
this “unquestionably substantial[ly] burden[ed]’ them in some sense” 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 38. 
 107.  Id. at 40 (quoting 45 C.F.R 147.131(c)(1) (2015)). 
 108.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 40. 
 109.  Id. at 35–36. 
 110.  Id. at 36 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763, n.9 (2014)). 
 111.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 34–35. 
 112.  Id. at 41. 
 113.  Id. at 42. 
 114.  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
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because the Government cannot “satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and 
desires.”115 
The Catholic Groups argue that these cases are distinct; here, the 
regulations pressure them to take action, whereas the litigants in Roy and 
Lyng objected to Government action. The Government responds that the 
claimants in Roy made the same argument—i.e., that the government 
forced them to submit an application with their daughter’s social security 
number on it.116 The Court in that case distinguished between individual 
and government action even if the claimants’ religion did not.117 
B.  The Government Must Prove A Compelling Interest If The Petitioners 
Are Substantially Burdened 
1.  Catholic Groups’ Arguments 
If the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the Catholic Groups’ 
exercise of religion, the Government must show that the regulation “is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.”118 According to the 
Catholic Groups, the Government has not done so here. 
The Catholic Groups claim that the Government does not have a 
compelling interest in ensuring that women receive full and equal health 
coverage, which includes contraceptive coverage, because the Government 
has granted many exemptions to the contraceptive mandate.119 When the 
Government grants any exemption to a regulatory scheme it is difficult for 
that interest to be considered compelling, even more so when there are 
multiple exemptions, like here.120 
2.  Government’s Argument 
The Government argues that there is a compelling interest in female 
preventive health care coverage, and that exemptions to this rule do not 
undermine this interest.121 The Government points out that five justices in 
Hobby Lobby determined that the Government “has a compelling interest in 
 
 115.  Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439 (1998). 
 116.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 46–47. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012). 
 119.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 59–68. For example, non-religious small 
businesses and churches are exempt. Id. at 63–64. 
 120.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432–33 
(2006) (reasoning that exemptions to a law make the government’s purported interests in enforcing the 
law less compelling). 
 121.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 54–55. 
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providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of 
female employees.”122 The Government writes about the health benefits of 
contraception, including many non-pregnancy related benefits.123 
Additionally, there is a compelling interest in women having equal access 
to health care coverage as men.124 
C.  The Accommodation Must Be The Least-Restrictive Means Of 
Furthering The Government’s Compelling Interest 
1.  Catholic Groups’ Arguments 
The Catholic Groups argue that even if the Government were to meet 
its burden of proving a compelling interest in preventive health care 
coverage for women, the contraceptive mandate is not the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.125 RFRA’s least-restrictive-means test is 
“exceptionally demanding”126 and that test is not met here. Instead of 
burdening the Catholic Groups, the Government could allow their 
employees to buy contraception-only coverage on an exchange or full 
coverage through an exchange as it does for employees of exempt 
organizations.127 
This would not be difficult for the Government. The Government 
would only need to tweak the structure of its existing program.128  Within 
the grand scheme of the ACA, modifying the exchanges to comply with 
RFRA for the Catholic Groups’ benefit would only be a minor 
adjustment.129 
Likewise, employees would only have to take minor steps to sign up 
for a new health care plan.130 These steps are no more burdensome than 
what many people do to receive Medicaid benefits. The Government argues 
 
 122.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 55 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 
S. Ct. 2751, 2785–86) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799–80, n.23 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting)). 
 123.  See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 55–58 (discussing how contraception 
prevents unintended pregnancy, complications from pregnancies, pelvic pain, menstrual disorders, and 
certain cancers). 
 124.  Id. at 58. 
 125.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 72. 
 126.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 127.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 72; Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 
77. 
 128.  See Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 72 (reasoning Catholic Groups could be 
exempt from providing contraception without burdening the government because adequate mechanisms 
already exist). 
 129.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 76. 
 130.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 73. 
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these additional steps would make coverage less accessible to certain 
women, but “the government may not ‘assume a plausible, less restrictive 
alternative would be ineffective’ just because it ‘requires a consumer to 
take action.’”131 The Catholic Groups concede that some employees would 
not qualify for the exchanges as they are currently structured.132 However, 
the employees of exempt organizations are in the same situation, and 
RFRA “may in some circumstances require the Government to expend 
additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs.”133 
Moreover, Catholic Groups proffer non-exchange based less restrictive 
alternatives: The Government could use Title X funds to pay for 
contraceptive coverage.134 Or the Government could provide the employees 
coverage through Medicaid, Medicare, or a refundable tax credit.135 
Similar to their argument that there is no compelling government 
interest, the Catholic Groups argue that the Government cannot claim that 
the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its 
interests when it applies less religiously burdensome regulations to exempt 
organizations.136 In other words, the Government has not explained why 
rules that work for exempt organizations cannot apply to the currently 
accommodated organizations. 
2.  Government’s Argument 
The Government argues that the contraceptive mandate will not be as 
effective if there are costs or burdens placed on women.137 There is a 
benefit to “seamless” health care coverage, which is not possible if women 
have to take additional steps to receive contraceptive coverage, because 
even a minor hindrance to access leads to adverse consequences like 
unintended and risky pregnancies.138 And any additional steps women 
would have to take to receive health care coverage would place them at a 
disadvantage compared to men.139 
According to the Government, the Catholic Groups’ proffered less 
restrictive alternatives are not valid alternatives under RFRA because they 
 
 131.  Id. at 72 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)). 
 132.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 73–74. 
 133.  Id. at 73–74 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014)). 
 134.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 75 (noting that Title X is a program devoted to 
providing family planning services and it is available to any public entity). 
 135.  Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 81–82. 
 136.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 77. 
 137.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 74–75. 
 138.  Id. at 74–76. 
 139.  Id. at 75. 
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raise costs and increase burdens on women.140 Moreover, many of the 
purported alternatives would require new laws or regulations.141 These 
plans “operate outside any ‘existing, recognized, workable, and already-
implemented framework to provide coverage.’”142 This is unlike in Hobby 
Lobby where the accommodation was an “already-existing mechanism” for 
providing contraceptive coverage.143 
Moreover, the Catholic Groups put forth a limitless interpretation of 
RFRA because objecting employers could receive exemptions from such 
things as minimum wage laws and immunization requirements.144 
According to the Government, there is no way Congress intended such 
absurd results when enacting RFRA.145 
Finally, the Government claims the Catholic Groups’ alternatives are 
unfeasible because insurance companies do not provide contraception-only 
coverage; the Government could only provide such coverage by 
implementing new laws or regulations.146 Nor is it feasible for the 
Government to assume the cost of subsidizing all health care coverage for 
female employees if the Government adopted the Catholic Groups’ other 
exchange plan. According to the Government, the key analysis is whether 
there is a less restrictive alternative “available.”147 None of these options 
are available. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Under RFRA, a plaintiff must first prove that it has a sincere religious 
belief that is substantially burdened by the regulation. If it does so, the 
Government must prove that the regulation furthers a compelling 
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest. 
Here, the Catholic Groups have proven that the accommodation 
substantially burdens their free exercise: it mandates that they facilitate 
access to contraception that they are religiously opposed to providing. The 
Government may be able to prove that the accommodation furthers a 
compelling interest in women’s health and equality, but it has not shown 
 
 140.  Id. at 76. 
 141.  Id. at 76–77. 
 142.  Id. at 79 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014)). 
 143.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 54. 
 144.  Id. at 79–80. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 82–83. 
 147.  Id. at 84 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)). 
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that the accommodation is the least-restrictive means of furthering this 
compelling interest—the Government could provide contraception using 
ACA exchanges without conscripting the Catholic Groups. 
A.  The Catholic Groups Are Substantially Burdened By The Contraceptive 
Mandate 
The Court should hold that the contraceptive mandate substantially 
burdens the Catholic Groups. The Catholic Groups accurately characterize 
some of the Government’s arguments as attacks on the sincerity of their 
beliefs, which all parties have acknowledged is impermissible. To be sure, 
there is a certain appeal to the Government’s position. All it requires is that 
the Catholic Groups file a one-page notice. And the Government is correct 
that interpreting RFRA as broadly as the Catholic Groups seek may impede 
the Government’s ability to enact its policy goals.148 However, RFRA 
requires that the Government take the Catholic Groups claims on their face 
as sincere. 
Thus, the Court must accept that filing the objection and maintaining a 
contractual relationship with a party that provides an organization’s 
employees contraception and abortifacients is a burden on religious 
exercise. As the Government notes, this does not necessarily mean that as a 
legal matter the Catholic Groups are substantially burdened, but the 
Government must give these groups’ religious beliefs deference. 
If, instead of filing a Form 700 or HHS Notice, the Government 
mandated that organizations flip a light switch on a Saturday in order to 
object to providing contraceptive coverage, it seems unlikely anyone would 
question an Orthodox Jewish organization’s opposition to this practice.149 
The Court would apply strict scrutiny to that regulation. The Government 
treats these situations differently only because it is unwilling to allow 
religious organizations to claim that an administrative notice burdens them. 
But RFRA is clear. Arguments in favor of administrative convenience are 
irrelevant to whether the burden on religion is substantial. In effect, the 
Government is collapsing RFRA’s least-restrictive inquiry with its 
substantial burden inquiry. 
To be sure, if the Catholic Groups were truly able to opt out of the 
mandate, as the Government contends, the Catholic Groups would not be 
 
 148.  See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 48–49 (discussing different parades of 
horribles). 
 149.  See Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 42–43 (discussing how de minimis actions 
under Supreme Court precedent are substantial burdens). 
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substantially burdened. Likewise, the Government is correct that the 
Catholic Groups may not object to internal government policies or third-
party independent conduct. However, the accommodation does not truly 
opt out the Catholic Groups; they are directly burdened. And the Catholic 
Groups’ opposition to the contraceptive mandate does not derive from 
opposition to internal government policies or third-party conduct. 
The Government contends that filing the Form 700 or HHS Notice 
“gives rise to the occasion for the government to act,” but that the “issuer’s 
or TPA’s legal obligation” does not “derive from” the filing.150 But the rules 
are quite clear. To be an eligible organization and thus accommodated, a 
religious non-profit, such as the Catholic Groups, must file a Form 700 or 
HHS Notice.151 And “[w]hen [the notice] is provided to an issuer, the issuer 
has sole responsibility for providing” the contraception coverage.152 
Likewise, if a TPA receives a copy of the Form 700 or DOL Notice, and 
agrees to remain in a contractual relationship with the eligible organization, 
then the TPA “shall provide or arrange payments for contraceptive 
services.”153 Thus, the Catholic Groups must file a notice for any third party 
obligation to arise. 
The Government’s argument is further undermined by regulations that 
state that the Form 700 or HHS Notice will cause an eligible organization 
to comply with the Mandate.154 The Government argues that this is a petty 
semantics because if the word “exempts” had replaced “complies” in the 
regulation, the effect would be the same, and the Catholic Groups would 
not be burdened.155 But this is unsound for two reasons. 
First, words have meanings. The Government, through its rule making, 
states that the eligible organizations’ filing of the accommodation is as an 
act of compliance with a requirement that the Government knows the 
groups are religiously opposed to facilitating. It would not have 
characterized the accommodation this way in light of its knowledge about 
religious organizations’ objections to the contraceptive mandate unless 
filing a notice truly caused these religious groups to comply with the rule. 
In other words, the Government used “complies” instead of “exempt” 
because the Government recognizes a functional difference. Second, the 
Government’s argument fails because IRS “religious employers” are 
 
 150.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 38. 
 151.  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(4) (2015). 
 152.  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1)(i). 
 153.  26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2015). 
 154.  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c). 
 155.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 40. 
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exempt from the mandate entirely. Giving a church an exemption because 
of its religious objections is strong evidence that there is an objectionable 
act performed when an organization complies with the accommodation. 
Additionally, the Government’s own characterization of the mandate 
defeats its argument that Third Parties have an independent obligation to 
provide the Catholic Groups’ employees contraceptive coverage. There 
would be no need to force the Catholic Groups to  file the accommodation 
if Third Parties already have an independent obligation to provide the 
female employees coverage regardless of the Catholic Groups’ actions.156 
Also, the Government’s reliance on Burwell v. Hobby Lobby’s 
characterization of the mandate is misplaced. To be sure, in dicta the Court 
wrote that the accommodation opted out and “effectively exempt[ed]” 
objecting religious employers from the mandate.157 But the Court was only 
reasoning that the accommodation was a less burdensome alternative than 
forcing the claimants to pay for contraceptive services; it did not hold that 
the accommodation was permissible per se, and it did not analyze whether 
the accommodation could also be a substantial burden.158 
Moreover, cases like Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery and Bowen v. 
Roy do not support the Government’s argument that the Catholic Groups 
are attempting to impermissibly interfere with internal government 
policy.159 Here, unlike in those cases, the Petitioners are complaining about 
regulations that burden them directly. The Government argues that the 
litigants in Roy made the same argument as the Catholic Groups—i.e., if 
and only if the Roy parents filed a public benefit form would the 
Government use the daughter’s social security number in violation of the 
parents’ religious beliefs.160 
But Roy does not support the Government’s argument. The Roy parents 
did not argue that filing a benefits form without a social security number 
would violate their religious belief per se, as the Catholic Groups do here 
with a notice.161 Instead, the parents argued that it was a violation of their 
religious beliefs for the Government to use their daughter’s social 
security.162 Their only objection to filing the benefits form was that they 
 
 156.  See Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 51–52 (reasoning that the Government 
would not require notices if they were meaningless). 
 157.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763, n.9 (2014). 
 158.  See id. (discussing the accommodation as a possible less restrictive alternative). 
 159.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 54. 
 160.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 36. 
 161.  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 697 (1986). 
 162.  Id. 
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had to include their daughter’s number on the form.163 This case actually 
supports the Catholic Groups’ argument because a majority of the Justices 
determined that the Government was religiously burdening the family by 
forcing the parents to include the daughter’s social security number on the 
form. If including a social security number on a form is a religious burden, 
a form which enables and triggers abortifacient use is also a religious 
burden. 
Finally, an analogy illustrates how the accommodation substantially 
burdens religious exercise. According to the Government, under the 
Catholic Groups’ interpretation of RFRA, “[a] conscientious objector to the 
draft could claim that the act of identifying himself as such on his Selective 
Service card constitutes a substantial burden because that identification 
would then trigger the draft of a fellow selective service registrant in his 
place.”164 Clearly this would be an awful result. The Catholic Groups 
proffer a different analogy: “a conscientious objector who (quite 
reasonably) objects to a government policy that allows him to avoid 
military service only by providing a form that both identifies and obligates 
a family member or friend to serve in his stead” is obviously burdened.165 
The Catholic Groups’ analogy more accurately describes the 
accommodation because filing the objection identifies a specific Third 
Party and obligates that Third Party to provide contraceptive services. Just 
as the Catholic Groups could not object to anyone getting drafted, they are 
not objecting to any party providing their employees contraception. For 
example, the Government could pay for the employees’ coverage. But the 
Catholic Groups’ religious beliefs are burdened when their action 
“identifies and obligates” a party with which they have a pre-existing 
relationship to provide services they object to providing. 
B.  The Government Has A Compelling Interest In Providing Contraceptive 
Services To Women 
The Court should hold—or at least assume without deciding—that 
there is a compelling interest here. There is no question that contraception 
provides women numerous health benefits. The Catholic Groups skirt away 
from addressing these benefits seemingly because it is obvious.166 
Nevertheless, the Catholic Groups contend that typically the Government 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 48. 
 165.  Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 45. 
 166.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 55. 
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in a strict scrutiny context cannot claim that an interest is compelling but 
then enact numerous exemptions to the regulation designed to accomplish 
the interest.167 
Insofar as exemptions to regulations defeat the Government’s 
compelling interest arguments in other contexts, in light of Hobby Lobby 
there is a compelling interest here. Five Justices thought so in Hobby 
Lobby, and their rationales apply just as strongly to this case. Although the 
Catholic Groups’ argument about numerous exemptions do not defeat the 
Government’s claim for a compelling interest, these arguments are key to 
resolving the least-restrictive-alternative inquiry. 
C.  The Catholic Groups Proffer Alternatives That Are Less Restrictive 
Than The Accommodation 
It is too difficult for the Government to prove that the accommodation 
is the least-restrictive means of providing women preventive care 
equivalent to the preventative care that men receive. The Catholic Groups’ 
most plausible proffered alternative is that the Government could allow 
their employees to buy contraception-only coverage through the existing 
ACA exchanges. Recipients of these plans would have two healthcare 
cards: one from their employer covering everything but contraception and 
one from an exchange plan only covering contraception. 
The Government mischaracterizes the Catholic Groups’ plan as an 
impermissible new program. The ACA dramatically changed the United 
States health care industry. When examining the effect of the Catholic 
Groups’ proffered alternatives to the mandate, one must look at the ACA as 
a whole. This dispute is just another case in a line of cases defining the 
constitutionality and statutory permissibility of the new ACA program. 
Given the total amount of ACA subsidies already provided by the 
Government, the Catholic Groups’ proffered alternative would cost very 
little additional money and would only require minor tweaks to the ACA’s 
regulatory scheme. Certainly the Government can offer contraception-only 
coverage through exchanges. The ACA exchanges could have initially been 
designed this way. Instead, the Government decided to use an 
accommodation that burdens religious exercise. It is a weak argument for 
the Government to now claim that this alternative, one that would have 
easily been implemented when the exchanges were designed, is an 
impermissible alternative to the accommodation. 
 
 167.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433 (2006). 
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Moreover, the Government asserts that it should not have to assume the 
cost of providing contraceptive coverage to women via the exchanges. But 
under the accommodation the Government—not the Catholic Groups—
pays Third Parties a premium to provide contraception. There is no reason 
to expect that paying for this contraceptive coverage through an exchange 
program will cost significantly more than paying Third Parties. 
The Government’s strongest argument is that women, if they have to 
take additional steps to receive preventive care via an exchange, will not 
receive coverage equal to what men receive. By definition, if women have 
to take an extra step than men, they are not on an equal footing. To be sure, 
under the Catholic Groups’ exchange-based plans, female employees will 
have to take some additional steps to receive coverage. But the effort 
required of female employees under the Catholic Groups’ plan is de 
minimis—a few clicks on the website. Thus, there is a permissible less 
restrictive alternative.168 
CONCLUSION 
The accommodation’s notice is only a piece of paper to most people, 
but the Catholic Groups’ sincere religious objections to the accommodation 
have to be credited. RFRA applies here because the Catholic Groups are 
substantially burden. And the Government fails to defend the 
accommodation under the exceptionally demanding strict scrutiny test 
because there are less restrictive alternatives available to the Government 
to accomplish its goals that do not burden the Catholic Groups. The Court 
should strike down the accommodation. Doing so will not give the Catholic 
Groups a key to the kingdom, but it is better for them than going to hell in a 
HHS notice. 
 
 
 168.  See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (reasoning an alternative 
was less restrictive even though it required consumers to take more action than the existing regulatory 
scheme). 
